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STUDENT NOTES 253
In Patternson v. Miracle, the court recognized a partial assign-
ment as effective over a subsequent attachment, finding an acceptance
of the assignment by the local agent of the insurance company, and
presuming that the local agent had the authority to do so in the
absence of a showing to the contrary. This possibly indicates a desire
on the part of the court to avoid the result of the decision in Henry
Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Denker's Exr.
The rule in Henry Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Denlcer's Exr., is contrary
to the weight of authority in the United States, and in opposition to
the general trend of the law of assignments in the United States and
Kentucky in particular. Reason, as well as practical considerations of
the commercial world, is against it. It is submitted that it should be
restricted as far as possible in the future, if not directly overruled.
PAUL OBERST.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION AS INCOME OF OFFICER'S
SALARY EXEMPT FROM DIMINUTION DURING TERM OF
OFFICE.
The Kentucky Income Tax Act, passed by a special session of
the General Assembly in 1936, provides:
"A tax is hereby annually levied for each taxable year upon
every resident individual of this State upon his entire net income
as herein defined for purposes of taxation. ... ."
Plaintiff, a judge of the circuit court, sought an injunction to
prevent defendant, as state commissioner of revenue, from enforcing
penalties against him because of his failure to file an income tax
report in accordance with the requirements of the statute, contending
that the tax, insofar as it affected his salary as judge, was unconsti-
tutional in that it diminished his compensation during his term of
office in violation of Sections 161 and 235 of the Constitution of Ken-
tucky. Held (three judges dissenting, by a special Court of Appeals,
the judges of the regular court having declared themselves disqualified
to act), that the tax did not diminish plaintiff's compensation during
his term of office within the meaning of the State Constitution, and
that the act was therefore valid.3 The undiminished compensation
guaranteed by the Constitution, the court said, means compensation
as such, and not "exemption of public officials from any tax that is
levied on any other citizen of Kentucky ... The Commonwealth,
the employer of the person to whom such wages are payable unless and
until said employer shall signify in writing upon said instrument his
assent to said assignment ... "
U253 Ky. 347, 69 S. W. (2d) 708 (1934).
'Ky. Stats. (Carroll, 1936), § 4281lb14.
2Ky. Const., § 161: "The compensation of any city, county, town,
or municipal officer shall not be changed after his election or appoint-
ment, or during his term of office." Id., § 235: "Salaries of public
officers shall not be changed during the terms for which they were
elected."
'Martin, Commissioner of Revenue v. Wolfford, 269 Ky. 411, 107
S. W. (2d) 267 (1937).
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cities, counties, and taxing districts must be supported or else govern-
mental functions will cease, and those who are receiving their com-
pensations from the Commonwealth or its governmental agencies
should bear their proportional part of the expense of maintaining the
very governmental institutions from which they derive their liveli-
hood."'
Two views exist, each bolstered by the authority of decided cases,
as to the taxability under a general income tax statute of the salary
of a public official whose compensation is constitutionally protected
against diminution during his term of office. One such line of cases
holds that such taxation is a reduction of compensation which violates
the constitutional guaranty; a second, with which the Wolfford case'
must now be listed, holds that such a tax is not within the constitu-
tional prohibition, and is therefore valid.
The majority rule, it may be observed, is to the effect that such
a tax is unconstitutional. It has been held by the United States
Supreme Court that under Article 3 of the Constitution of the United
States, which-provides that judges of the Supreme and lower federal
courts shall receive for their services a compensation "which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office,"' the salaries of
such judges may not be subjected to taxation by CongressV The con-
stitutional provision, the court held, does not merely forbid direct
diminution, but was intended to include indirect diminution, such
as would be effected by the imposition of an income tax. Nor does the
Sixteenth Amendment, giving Congress power to "collect taxes on
incomes from whatever source derived,"" permit Congress to tax the
incomes of federal judges derived from salary; it was not the purpose
of the amendment to extend the federal taxing power to subjects not
previously included within its scope, but merely to remove the require-
ment of the Constitution that direct taxes be apportioned among the
states in proportion to population.
Furthermore, in Miles v. Graham,' the Supreme Court held that
'Id. at 419.
r Supra, note 3.
6 United States Const., Art. 3, § 1. "The judges, both of the supreme
and inferior courts ... shall, at stated times, receive for their services
a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continu-
ance in office."
1 Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550, 64 L. Ed. 887, 11
A. L. R. 532 (1920); (1922) 20 Mich. L. Rev. 540; (1921) 5 Minn. L.
Rev. 145. The holding of the Gore case as to the non-taxability of
salaries of federal judges was foreshadowed by an opinion of the
Attorney General in 1869 in regard to the income tax then in effect,
13 Op. Atty. Gen. 161 (1869), as well as by the dictum in Wayne,
Admr. v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 274, 290 (1891), and the dictum of
Mr. Justice Field in Pollock v: Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S.
429, 604, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759, 827 (1895).
8"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
'268 U. S. 501, 45 Sup. Ct. 601, 69 L. Ed. 1067 (1925).
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Congress could not impose an income tax upon the salary of a judge
of the Court of Claims, under the doctrine of the Gore case,' even
though the statute providing for the tax was in existence at the time
the judge took office and at the time the act fixing his salary was
passed. The purpose of Article 3, Section 1, said the court,
"was to impose upon Congress the duty definitely to declare what
sum shall be received by each judge out of the public funds and
the times for payment. When this duty has been complied with,
the amount specified becomes the compensation which is pro-
tected against diminution during his continuance in office.""
It is clear, however, that the doctrine of Evans v. Gore does not
apply with respect to federal officers and employees other than the
President and the federal judges. Such officers are not protected by
the constitutional provision, which by its terms applies only to the
President and the judiciary, 2 and Congress may therefore constitu-
tionally tax their salaries as income, even though such taxation does
reduce their compensation during their terms of office."3
The earliest case representing the majority view to be decided
by a state court is the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth ex rel.
Hepburn v. Mann," in which the court, apparently overruling by
implication the earlier case of Commissioners of Northumberland
County v. Chapman,3 held that a constitutional provision that judges
of the court of common pleas should receive a compensation "which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office" rendered
Invalid a tax upon the "salaries and emoluments of office" of such
judges. The court further held that even where the legislature had
increased the salary of the judge after his assumption of office, such
Increase was protected from taxation by this provision. In both the
Mann case and the Chapman case, the tax was not an income tax of
general application, but a special excise imposed on the holders of
"offices and posts of profit", though in each case the levy was appar-
ently part of a general scheme of license taxes embracing many trades
and professions.
In the case of City of Yew Orleans v. Lea," the question involved
was whether the city, as authorized by its charter, might constitu-
tionally tax the salary of a justice of the state supreme court, under
a constitutional provision that judges should receive "a salary which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." The
20 Supra, note 7.
n1d. at 508.
1'2upra, note 6; United States Const., Art. 2, § 1, cl. 6. "The Presi-
dent shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation,
-which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period
for which he may have been elected ..."
13 Galm v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 55 (1903) semble (decided under
the income tax act of 1862).
145 W. & S. 403 (Pa., 1843).
"2 Rawle 73 (Pa., 1829).
1 614 La. Ann. 197' (1859).
K. L. J.-8
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court, in holding the tax invalid, relied not only upon this constitu-
tional provision, but upon the principle of separation of powers ex-
pressly embodied in the constitution of Louisiana, arguing that the
existence of one department ought not to depend on the will of another,
as it would if the legislature could diminsh the salaries of the judiciary
by imposing a tax thereon. 0
Under a similar constitutional provision, North Carolina also
has adopted the majority view, holding that the legislature cannot im-
pose an income tax upon the salaries of the judges." Furthermore,
North Carolina is in accord with the early Pennsylvania case of Com-
monwealth ex rel. Hepburn v. Mann,8 in holding that such tax may
not be imposed even though the legislature has previously increased
a judge's salary during his term of office, on the ground that the
increase, from the time it becomes effective, constitutes as much a part
of the salary as the original amount, so that the whole becomes sub-
ject to the protection of the constitutional provision."
The majority rule is also followed by an advisory opinion of the
Supreme Court of Alabamai ° holding that under a constitutional pro-
vision that the compensation of any officer holding any civil office of
profit under the state or any county or municipality thereof shall not
be diminshed during his term of office, a proposed act levying an
occupational tax on salaries of county and state officers would be un-
constitutional. It should be noted, however, that this was not an
income tax of general application, but a tax on the salaries of the
officials as such. It would seem that under this constitutional pro-
vision a similar result might well be reached even in a jurisdiction
which held that an income tax of general application is not an uncon-
stitutional diminution of the officer's compensation.
Again, in the recent Delaware case of Green v. Du Pont," it was
held that the salary of the state attorney general was not subject to
the payment of state income tax in view of a provision in the state
Constitution that "no law shall extend the term of any public officer
or diminish his salary or emoluments after his election or appoint-
ment," notwithstanding the fact that this officer took office after enact-
ment of the tax statute.
The minority view, that the salary of a public official Is taxable as
income, and that such taxation is not an unconstitutional reduction
of such official's compensation during his term of office, is well repre-
sented by the leading case of State ex rel. Wickham v. Nygaard," de-
cided in Wisconsin in 1915. Here the court held that the provision of
the Wisconsin constitution to the effect that the compensation of any
IT In re Taxation of Salaries of Judges, 131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E. 970
(1902); Long v. Watts, 183 N. C. 99, 110 S. E. 765, 22 A. L. R. 293
(1922); (1922) 1 N. C. L. Rev. 39.
28 Supra, note 14.
"9Long v. Watts, supra, note 17.
70 In re Opinion of the Justices, 225 Ala. 502, 144 So. 111 (1932).
n- Del. - , 180 Atl. 437 (1935).
159 Wis. 396, 150 N. W. 513 (1915).
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public officer shall not be diminished during his term of office must be
read in connection with the later amendment which provided that
"taxes may also be imposed on incomes," so that the salary of a state
judge was subject to taxation under the state income tax act. The
court, speaking of the income tax amendment, said:
"We are not at liberty to rewrite this clause so as to read that
taxes may be 'imposed on incomes, except where the income con-
sists of a salary received by a public officer.' We perceive very
little room for construction, and if a doubtful question were in-
volved it should not be resolved against the exercise of the taxing
power by the state."."
Taylor v. Gehner," upheld the right of the state of Missouri to
impose an income tax upon the salary of a state judge notwithstanding
a provision of the state constitution that the salaries of such judges
should not be increased or diminished during the period for which
they were elected. The court, which quoted with approval from the
dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in Evans v. Gore, stated that
"From its historical background, the purpose intended to be sub-
served by the section is perfectly well known; it is one of the
checks and restraints imposed to secure the independence of the
judiciary. It is not a tax exemption provision."25
Also adhering to the minority view, the Montana court, in the
recent case of Poorman, v. State Board of Equalizationi held that a
statute imposing a net income tax on "every individual" applied to the
net Income derived from the salary of a state judge whose official
salary constituted his entire income, and that the tax did not violate
a constitutional provision prohibiting reduction of compensation of
public officers during their terms of office. The court said:
"It is impossible to construe a 'net' income tax law as an
amendment which reduces salaries by the amount of the tax; this
for the reason that the tax is not levied against the salary, and
does not affect all officials alike; of two officials whose salary in
the same, by reason of the allowable exemptions and deductions
from the 'gross income' in order to arrive at the taxable income
one may be required to pay a substantial tax and the other no tax
whatever, although neither has an income outside of his salary.
The 'net' result of the computation is but 'the profit derived frow
the operation' of a governmental instrumentality-the office-by
an Individual." ,"
To these cases representing the minority view, the instant case
must now be added.
As a matter of policy, it is submitted, the minority view is pref-
erable. Though it may be true that "the power to tax involves the
"Id. at -, 150 N. W. at 516. Cf. the holding in Evans v. Gore,
note 6, supra, that the federal income tax amendment does not extend
the federal taxing power to subjects previously excluded from its scope.
"329 Mo. 511, 45 S. W. (2d) 59, 82 A. L. R. 989 (1931) ; (1932) 32
Col. L. Rev. 915.
1Ia. at -, 45 S. W. (2d) at 60.
99 Mont. 543, 45 P. (2d) 307 (1935); (1935) 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
141.
rId. at -, 45 P. (2d) at 313.
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power to destroy,"-' it is difficult to find any destructive effect in a
requirement that public officers shall pay the same taxes as other
citizens. Theoretically, of course, a legislature with unlimited taxing
powers might at some future time discriminate against public officers
by a higher tax rate than that imposed upon ordinary citizens; but
the fact that the power to tax the salaries of officers as income might
be abused does not justify a court in holding invalid a tax which does
not abuse this power. The possibility of discrimination against the
salaries of public officials would not even exist in Kentucky, where it
is well established that excises must be uniform, in the sense that
classification of taxpayers thereunder may not be arbitrary and un-
reasonable. -O Nor does it seem likely that such a tax will have the
effect of undermining the principle of separation of powers and the
independence of the judiciary. "To require a man to pay the taxes
that all other men have to pay cannot possibly be made an instrument
to attack his independence as a judge."'
It would scarcely be argued that officers were protected by such
constitutional provisions from the necessity of paying property taxes,
sales taxes, and the like, though such taxes might be paid out of cur-
rent income derived solely from an official salary. An attempt might
be made to distinguish such a cqse from the case of an income tax
on the ground that such taxes are not levied upon the officer's salary,
though they may be paid therefrom. But the income tax itself affects
the officer's salary only in a similarly indirect manner; the tax is not
upon the salary, but upon net income, and the salary is not even the
measure of the tax, as is shown by the fact that two persons whose
sole sources of income were from salaries of equal size might pay
income taxes of different amounts, because of differences in their
exemptions."
On principle, therefore, it is submitted that the instant case is
correctly decided, though the numerical weight of authority is de-
cidedly against it. JOSEPH S. FREELAND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-
VENUE STATUTES DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN RESIDENTS
AND NON-RESIDENTS.
Defendants, residents of Mississippi, while driving an automobile
through Kentucky, collided with and damaged a truck owned and
operated by plaintiff.; The accident occurred in Boyle County and plain-
tiff, a Jefferson County corporation, brought an action in that county
and service was made on defendants by serving a copy of the summons
."McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819).
"'See Trimble, Excise Taxes and the Uniformity 01azise of the Con-
stitution of Kentucky (1937), 25 Ky. L. J. 342, and cases cited therein.
"Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, Evans v. Gore, 253
U. S. 245, 265.
"Poorman v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, note 26.
:'Henry Fischer Packing Co. v. Mattox, 262 Ky. 318, 90 S. W. (2d)
70 (1936).
